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Down the Rabbit Hole: Applying a 
Right to Be Forgotten to Personal 
Images Uploaded on Social Networks 
Eugenia Georgiades* 
The right to be forgotten has been the subject of extensive  
scrutiny in the broad context of data protection. However, little con-
sideration has been given to the misuse of personal images that are 
uploaded on social networks. Given the prevalent use of online and 
digital spaces, social networks process and use various forms of 
data, including personal images that are uploaded by individuals. 
The potential for misuse of images is particularly acute when users 
upload images of third parties. In light of the European Union’s  
enshrinement of the “right to be forgotten” amid provisions of the 
General Data Protection Regulation that tighten protections for  
Internet users’ privacy, this Article examines whether the European 
“right to be forgotten” is a model that could be adopted, specifically 
in Australia, and perhaps elsewhere, as a mechanism to protect 
against the misuse of people’s images within social networks. 
 
  
 
*  Dr. Eugenia Georgiades, Assistant Professor Faculty of Law, Bond University. The 
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“The Internet doesn’t forget.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Social networks facilitate communication and interaction online. 
When people communicate and interact online, their private lives 
often become public. Social networks such as Facebook, Instagram, 
and Twitter have sparked new trends in the way people exchange 
and communicate information, particularly personal images. These 
platforms actively encourage people to share their lives with their 
friends, family, and social connections within the digital environ-
ment.2 All too frequently, people’s images are captured in photo-
graphs and shared on social networks without the person knowing 
 
1 Jef Ausloos, The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’—Worth Remembering?, 28 COMPUTER L. & 
SECURITY REV. 143, 143 (2012). 
2 Eugenia Georgiades, Reusing Images Uploaded Online: How Social Networks 
Contracts Facilitate the Misuse of Personal Images, 40 EUR. INTELL. PROP. J. 435, 441 
(2018). Part of Facebook’s Data Policy states that:  
[Facebook is] able to deliver our Services, personalise content, and 
make suggestions for you by using this information to understand how 
you use and interact with our Services and the people or things you’re 
connected to and interested in on and off our Services. We also use 
information we have to provide shortcuts and suggestions to you. For 
example, we are able to suggest that your friend tag you in a picture 
by comparing your friend’s pictures to information we’ve put together 
from your profile pictures and the other photos in which you’ve been 
tagged. If this feature is enabled for you, you can control whether we 
suggest that another user tag you in a photo using the ‘Timeline and 
Tagging’ settings. When we have location information, we use it to 
tailor our Services for you and others, like helping you to check-in and 
find local events or offers in your area or tell your friends that you are 
nearby. We conduct surveys and research, test features in develop-
ment, and analyse the information we have to evaluate and improve 
products and services, develop new products or features, and conduct 
audits and troubleshooting activities. 
See Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/ [https://perma.cc/
792W-W93K] (emphasis added); see also BRENDAN VAN ALSENOY ET AL., BELGIAN 
PRIVACY COMMISSION, FROM SOCIAL MEDIA SERVICE TO ADVERTISING NETWORK: A 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF FACEBOOK’S REVISED POLICIES AND TERMS (Mar. 31, 2015), 
http://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/en/news/item/facebooks-revised-policies-and-terms-
v1-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4RF-DJCA]. 
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that their images have been taken and shared online.3 In the process 
of sharing images on social networks, people often relinquish con-
trol over the use of their images, which allows the images to be  
exploited by third parties and social networks.4 The use of digital 
and communication technologies creates a need to protect personal 
images and the information captured in those images from misuse.5 
This Article examines whether the European Union (“EU”)’s 
“right to be forgotten” provides a possible solution to the problem 
of personal images being misused on social networks in Australia. 
Specifically, it considers whether the EU’s right to be forgotten is a 
model that could be adopted in Australia as a mechanism to protect 
against the misuse of people’s images within social networks. 
 
3 Notable examples include the infamous photograph of a naked Prince Harry partying 
in Las Vegas. See Prince Harry Naked During Vegas Rager, TMZ (Aug. 22, 2012), 
http://www.tmz.com/2012/08/21/prince-harry-naked-photos-nude-vegas-hotel-party 
[https://perma.cc/J48L-E5N2]. The problem with this is captured in Katy Perry’s tweet 
against Australian Media where she said: “Australian PRESS: you should be ashamed of 
your paparazzi & tabloid culture. Your paparazzi have no respect, no integrity, no 
character. NO HUMANITY.” Perry also wrote: “I was stalked by many grown men today 
as I tried to take a quiet walk to the beach. These men would not stop as I pleaded over & 
over to let me have my space. Many other people stopped to try to help but the paps 
continued to laugh at me & hold their barrels up and shoot.” And further: “This is 
PERVERTED & disgusting behaviour that should NEVER be tolerated, especially by 
people who do NOT want this.” Katy Perry (@katyperry), TWITTER (Nov. 21, 2014, 6:39 
PM), https://twitter.com/katyperry/status/535985788983721984/photo/1 [https://perma.cc
/683Q-FB7F]. 
4 See generally VICTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN 
THE DIGITAL AGES 1–2 (2011); Franz Werro, The Right to Inform v. the Right to Be 
Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash, in HAFTUNGSRECHT IM DRITTEN MILLENNIUM = 
LIABILITY IN THE THIRD MILLENNIUM (Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi et al. eds., 2009); Ausloos, 
supra note 1; Paul A. Bernal, A Right to Delete?, 2 EUR. J.L. & TECH. (2011); Muge 
Fazlioglu, Forget Me Not: The Clash of the Right to Be Forgotten and Freedom of 
Expression on the Internet, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 149, 151 (2013); Andra Giurgiu, 
Challenges of Regulating a Right to Be Forgotten with Particular Reference to Facebook, 
7 MASARYK U. J.L. & TECH. 361, 362 (2013); Alessandro Mantelero, The EU Proposal for 
a General Data Protection Regulation and the Roots of the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’, 29 
COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 229, 230 (2013); Marie-Andrée Weiss, First Amendment 
Trumps Couple’s Right of Publicity; Copyright Claim to Proceed, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & 
PRAC. 797, 798 (2014). 
5 See Bert-Jaap Koops, Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows: A Critical Analysis of the 
“Right to Be Forgotten” in Big Data Practice, 8 SCRIPTED 229, 230 (2011); see also Viviane 
Reding, The Upcoming Data Protection Reform for the European Union, 1 INT’L DATA 
PRIVACY L. 3, 3 (2011). 
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I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
The right to be forgotten originated from a growing concern 
about the impact of digital technologies in general on personal  
privacy. As Viviane Reding observed, “If an individual no longer 
wants his personal data to be processed or stored by a data control-
ler, and if there is no legitimate reason for keeping it, the data should 
be removed from their system.”6 The early 1990s saw the use of 
digital technologies increase, which created a need to protect people 
from potential abuse.7 As communication technologies sparked new 
trends in the way people exchanged and communicated personal  
information, the EU recognized that new data protection laws were 
necessary to protect individual privacy and private life.8 To this end, 
European regulators developed the Data Directive9 in 1995 to pro-
tect an individual’s personal data and the processing of such data. 
European data-protection laws were enacted at a time when technol-
ogy was less advanced and the exchange of personal information 
was significantly lower than it is at present,10 in part because the use 
of social networks was not as prevalent twenty-five years ago as it 
is today. 
One of the challenges that arises with most new forms of tech-
nology is that the technology often evolves faster than the law.11 The 
position with social networks is no different. As Andra Giurgiu  
argues, “The main problem relies in the fact that the rapidly chang-
ing societal model has not allowed for legal norms to catch up.”12 
Concerned about the threat to individual privacy created by the 
 
6 Press Release, Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the Eur. Comm’n, EU Justice 
Comm’r, The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for 
Modern Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age (Jan. 22, 2012), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-26_en.htm [https://perma.cc/JPU6-
VYZ7]. 
7 See Koops, supra note 5, at 230; see also Reding, supra note 5, at 3. 
8 See Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, opened for signature 
Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S No. 5, Art 8. 
9 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Directive]. 
10 See Giurgiu, supra note 4, at 362–64. 
11 Id. at 362–65; Koops, supra note 5; Ausloos, supra note 1, at 148. 
12 Giurgiu, supra note 4, at 362–65. 
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widespread use of data storage and data mining, European regulators 
recognized that the rights to privacy and data protection in the Data 
Directive had become outdated.13 
The problems with the law under the 1995 Data Directive were 
highlighted in the landmark 2014 Court of Justice decision of 
Google Spain v. Gonzalez.14 The case arose when Mr. Gonzalez 
lodged a complaint against La Vanguardia Ediciones SL (a daily 
Spanish newspaper with a wide circulation), Google Spain, and 
Google Inc.15 The basis of the complaint was that whenever an  
internet user searched for Mr. Gonzalez’s name using the Google 
search engine, the results would link to two pages from the La  
Vanguardia newspaper, which mentioned Mr. Gonzalez’s name in 
connection with proceedings for social security debts.16 
Mr. Gonzalez requested two things. The first was that the news-
paper remove or alter the pages so that “the personal data relating to 
him no longer appeared or to use certain tools made available by 
search engines in order to protect the data.”17 The second request 
was that Google Spain and Google Inc. be required to remove or 
conceal the personal data relating to him so that that data would not 
be included in the search results.18 The grounds for Mr. Gonzalez’s 
claims were that the proceedings for the social security debts men-
tioned in the newspaper links had been resolved for a number of 
years. Consequently, that information and any references to that  
information was no longer relevant to answering a search of his 
name conducted at the present time or in the future.19 
 
13 See discussion infra Part I. 
14 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317 (May 13, 2014). 
15 Id. at ¶¶ 14–15. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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The court ordered Google Spain to remove Gonzalez’s personal 
data20 from the internet.21 The court held that data controllers should 
remove data where the data was “inadequate, irrelevant or no 
longer relevant, or excessive in relation to [the] purposes [for which 
they were originally collected or processed] [emphasis added] and 
in the light of the time that has elapsed.”22 The Court of Justice ruled 
that people could request the removal of their data published by  
operators of search engines.23 
The Google Spain v. Gonzalez24 decision not only highlighted 
some of the inadequacies with the 1995 Data Directive, but it also 
provided a possible solution. After some debate,25 on December 15, 
201526 the European Parliament passed the General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”),27 which received approval from the Euro-
pean Council on April 8, 2016 and became effective on May 28, 
2018.28 One of the key aspects of the GDPR is that it supersedes the 
 
20 Data Directive, supra note 9, at art. 2(a), which defines data broadly as: 
‘[P]]ersonal data’ shall mean any information relating to an identified 
or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is 
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific 
to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity. 
21 Google Spain SL, 2014 E.C.R. 317 at ¶ 93. 
22 Id. The ruling is based on the Data Directive, supra note 9. 
23 Id. at ¶ 98.   
24 Google Spain SL, 2014 E.C.R. 317 at ¶ 97–98. 
25 See W. Gregory Voss, Looking at the European Union Data Protection Law Reform 
Through a Different Prism: The Proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation Two 
Years Later, 17 J. INTERNET L. 1, 22 (2014); see also Peter Blume, The Myths Pertaining 
to the Proposed General Data Protection Regulation, 4 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 269, 269–
73 (2014). 
26 See European Commission Press Release IP/12/46, Agreement on Commission’s EU 
Data Protection Reform Will Boost Digital Single Market (Dec. 15, 2015), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6321_en.htm> [https://perma.cc/25XL-ETPP]. 
27 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 
1 [hereinafter General Data Protection Regulation]. 
28 See Reform of EU Data Protection Rules, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/
info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform_en [https://perma.cc/KT8L-FJ9K]. 
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Data Directive and strengthens individual rights, through the incor-
poration of a right to be forgotten.29 
The 2016 GDPR provides that where a data controller has made 
data public, the controller must take “reasonable steps, including 
technical measures[ in relation to data for the publication of which 
the controller is responsible], to inform [third parties] which are pro-
cessing the data that a data subject [requests them to erase] any links 
to, or copy or replication of [that] personal data.”30 The GDPR pro-
vides that a data subject shall have “the right to obtain from the con-
troller the erasure of personal data” relating to them and the  
abstention from further dissemination of such data especially in  
relation to personal data which are made available by the subject 
data while he or she was a child.31 Article 17 also gives data subjects 
the right to be forgotten and to erase data relating to them.32 It pro-
vides that users have the right to have information deleted in four 
situations. This is where: 
 
29 The proposed amendments to the Data Directive included the rights of users to request 
that their personal data is “no longer processed and deleted when they are no longer needed 
for legitimate purposes.” Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions: A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union, 
COM (2010) 609 final, at sec. 2.1.3 (Apr. 11, 2010) [hereinafter A Comprehensive 
Approach]; see also General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 17. 
30 Id. at art. 17(2). 
31 Id.; see also id. at art. 17(1) (referencing back to articles 6(1) and 8(1) of the 
regulation). 
32 Id. at art. 17; see generally Ausloos, supra note 1; Steven C. Bennett, The Right to Be 
Forgotten: Reconciling EU and US Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161 (2012); 
Karen Eltis, Breaking Through the Tower of Babel: A Right to be Forgotten and How 
Trans-Systemic Thinking Can Help Re-Conceptualize Privacy Harm in the Age of 
Analytics, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 69 (2011); Koops, supra note 5; 
Barbara McDonald, Privacy, Princesses, and Paparazzi, 50 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 205 
(2005); Dominic McGoldbrick, Developments in the Right to Be Forgotten, 13 HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 761 (2013); Reding, supra note 5; Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: The Future of 
Privacy and Free Speech in the Age of Facebook and Google, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1525 
(2012); Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2011–12); 
Jeffrey Rosen, Free Speech, Privacy, and the Web That Never Forgets, 9 J. TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 345 (2011); Stijn Smet, Freedom of Expression and the Right to Reputation: 
Human Rights in Conflict, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 183 (2010); Rolph H. Weber, The Right 
to Be Forgotten: More Than Pandora’s Box?, 2 J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & E-LAW 
120 (2011); see also generally A Comprehensive Approach, supra note 29; Werro, supra 
note 4. 
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a) the personal data are no longer necessary in 
relation to the purposes for which it was  
collected or otherwise processed; 
b) the data subject withdraws consent on which 
the processing is based according to point (a) 
of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), 
and where there is no other legal ground for 
the processing; 
c) the data subject objects to the processing  
pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are no 
overriding legitimate grounds for the pro-
cessing, or the data subject objects to the pro-
cessing pursuant to Article 21(2); and 
d) the personal data have been unlawfully  
processed.33 
When applying the right to be forgotten to personal images shared 
online, there are a number of criteria that must be satisfied, as ex-
plained further in Part II below. Broadly, these are that: 
1. the requirements for protection are met; 
2. the use of the images falls within the scope of the 
right; and 
3. the use of the images falls outside of the 
exceptions to the right to be forgotten. 
The following section examines these elements in more detail. 
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR PROTECTION 
There are a number of criteria that must be satisfied in order for 
the right to be forgotten to apply. The first is that the images must 
fall within the meaning of “data” as provided in the GDPR.34 The 
second is that the person must be a “data subject.”35 The third factor 
that needs to be satisfied for the right to apply is that the images 
 
33 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 1 7(1); Giurgiu, supra note 
4, at 366; Mantelero, supra note 4, at 233; McGoldbrick, supra note 32, at 763. 
34 See infra Section II.A. 
35 See infra Section II.B. 
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must be controlled by a third party who is a “data controller.”36 The 
following sub-sections examine each in turn. 
A. Data 
In Europe, the term “data” is defined broadly to include any  
information that relates to a “data subject.”37 Any information that 
relates to a person or identifies a person in an online environment 
will be considered “personal data.”38 Photographs depicting peo-
ple’s likenesses are a way of identifying individuals and thus satisfy 
the definition of data in the Data Directive.39 
People who join social networks and engage in the digital world 
exchange and share various types of information. This information 
forms the data that is processed, collected, and stored in websites’ 
information systems. As social networks allow people to share  
images with multiple users simultaneously, a number of issues arise 
in relation to the control of those images. One issue with the control 
of uploaded images occurs when a person uploads images and those 
images are consequently reshared by third parties. The reshared im-
ages will be stored, collected and processed on their respective pro-
file pages (as well as the network’s information systems). Thus, a 
person whose images are reshared loses control over these images 
when they are reshared. Another issue that arises is that, under  
European law, capturing and sharing another person’s image on a 
social network by posting photographs of them online may be con-
sidered “processing and collecting” data. Given that people not only 
share and exchange their own images but also third-party images on 
social networks, such images that are shared form the “data” of the 
subject (i.e., the person whose image is being used or shared). Con-
sequently, a person loses control over their image when their image 
is captured in a photograph by a third party. 
 
36 See infra Section II.C. 
37 See Data Directive, supra note 9, at art. 2(a) (“‘personal data’ shall mean any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an 
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity”). 
38 Id. 
39 Id.; see also generally Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive 
on the Protection of Personal Data, 80 IOWA L. REV. 445 (1995). 
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B. Data Subject 
The second criterion that needs to be satisfied for the right to 
apply is that the person must be a “data subject.” European data  
protection laws apply to data subjects who are located in Europe. 
People who live in countries that are part of the EU, are entitled to 
rely on a right to be forgotten when their data are processed, col-
lected, or transferred to countries outside of the EU.40 
According to Article 4(1) of the GDPR, a data subject is a “nat-
ural person,”41 construed broadly as a person who can be “identified 
directly or indirectly, in particular reference to an identification 
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiolog-
ical, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”42 People who are 
users of social networks and social media will fall within the defini-
tion of a “data subject.” Accordingly, any photographs that contain 
a person’s image would also fall within the definition of “personal 
data,” as discussed above. 
C. Data Controller 
The third factor that needs to be satisfied for the right to apply is 
that the images must be controlled by a third party who is a “data 
controller.” Article 4(7) of the GDPR defines a “data controller”  
as follows: 
‘[C]ontroller’ means the natural or legal person, pub-
lic authority, agency or any other body which alone 
or jointly with others, determines the purposes and 
means of the processing of personal data; where the 
purposes and means of processing are determined by 
Union or Member State law, the controller or the 
 
40 See Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm’r, 56 I.L.M. 245 (2015) (EU) 
(Schrems objected to the transfer of his personal data from Facebook Ireland to servers in 
the United States). 
41 See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 4(1); see also Opinion 
5/2009 on Online Social Networking adopted on 12 June 2009, The Working Party on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data set up by 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995, 
art. 29, 1995 O.J. (L 281/31) (EC) [hereinafter Working Party Opinion]. 
42 Id. 
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specific criteria for its nomination may be provided 
for by Union or Member State law.43 
Google Spain v. Gonzalez confirms that search engines are data 
controllers and as such are liable under the GDPR.44 To fall within 
the definition of data controllers, the social network must determine 
the purpose and means of processing personal data. Social networks 
clearly fall within the definition of data controllers, because virtually 
every social network determines the purpose and means of pro-
cessing personal data. The processing of personal data occurs when 
people subscribe to a social network service because they provide 
personal information such as name, email, and often a profile pic-
ture, which are stored, collected, and processed on the social  
network’s information systems. For example, when people use  
Facebook, personal data processing occurs as an integral part of the 
company’s mission: “bringing people together.”45 In pursuit of this 
purpose, Facebook determines how people’s photographs will be 
processed and collected, including that the network will collect 
those images when people share images of third parties.46 Thus,  
Facebook is a data controller because the network processes, stores, 
transfers and collects people’s personal data.47 Similarly, Insta-
gram’s purpose is for people to share their photographs with other 
users, and it is for this purpose that they collect and process people’s 
information and specifically their photographs.48 Twitter also shares 
 
43 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 4(7); see also Data 
Directive, supra note 9, at art. 2; Rebecca Wong, Social Networking: Anybody Is a Data 
Controller, NOTTINGHAM L. SCH. (Sept. 21, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1271668 
[https://perma.cc/8CED-L4AD] [hereinafter Wong, Anybody Is a Data Controller]. 
44 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 33 (May 13, 2014). 
45 Adam Mosseri, Bringing People Closer Together, FACEBOOK (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/01/news-feed-fyi-bringing-people-closer-together/ 
[https://perma.cc/4R4V-RMCA]. 
46 See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 7 (providing that a 
person can withdraw their consent). 
47 See, e.g., Rebecca Wong, Social Networking: A Conceptual Analysis of a Data Controller, 
14 COMM. L. 142, 142 (2009) [hereinafter Wong, A Conceptual Analysis]; Working Party 
Opinion, supra note 41. 
48 See Features, INSTAGRAM, https://about.instagram.com/features [perma.cc/PN2R-
7XQD]; see also Wong, supra note 47; Working Party Opinion, supra note 41. 
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the same purpose as Facebook and Instagram, which satisfies the 
definition of a data controller of the Data Directive and the GDPR. 
One question that arises is whether individuals who share other 
people’s images fall under the definition of data controller. Given 
the scope of Web 2.0 and the participative culture that it created, 
individuals who share other people’s images may also be treated as 
“data controllers.”49 This is because people share and exchange per-
sonal images within their profiles on social networks and thus facil-
itate the “processing” of personal data. A person may be a “data 
controller” when they capture an image and upload it on their social 
network profile page. When a person captures their own image (i.e., 
a selfie) and uploads that image on their profile, they are in effect 
collecting and processing their own data. This data in turn is stored 
on the social network information system. In situations where a per-
son captures an image of a third party, the information captured in 
the photograph forms part of a record which is collected and pro-
cessed when it is uploaded online. As a result, a person may also 
collect and process a third party’s data, and thus each person who 
has a social network page has the ability to collect and process other 
people’s data. Consequently, it is arguable that people who take pho-
tographs of third parties and upload and exchange the images on  
social networks would facilitate the “processing of personal data” 
and as such arguably fall within the definition of “data controller.” 
III. USE IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
The right to be forgotten provides that the “fundamental rights 
and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to  
privacy with respect to the processing of personal data” should be 
protected.50 The right to be forgotten strengthens the rights of data 
subjects when their data is used or misused, by giving them the right 
to control the use of their image when the image is shared by third 
parties.51 The right to be forgotten is not a mechanism that will  
actually prevent the misuse of personal images. Rather, it provides 
 
49 See, e.g., Wong, A Conceptual Analysis, supra note 47; Working Party Opinion, supra note 
41. 
50 Data Directive, supra note 9, at art. 1; see also General Data Protection Regulation, 
supra note 27, at art. 17. 
51 See supra Section II.C. 
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a remedy for people who have had their personal images misused. 
For example, the right enables a person whose data has been mis-
used to request the removal of the data; it does not prevent or pro-
vide protection against the misuse of the data. This right extends to 
data such as personal images that are uploaded and shared on social 
networks or appear in search results.52 Thus, a person would not be 
able to rely on the right to be forgotten to prevent the misuse of their 
image, but would be able to request that the data controller remove 
the misused image from the network’s system. 
The right to be forgotten operates in a number of different situ-
ations. The first is where the data is no longer relevant or if it is 
outdated (as in Google Spain v. Gonzalez).53 The second is when a 
person withdraws the consent on which the processing of the data is 
based.54 Under the GDPR, the withdrawal must be unambiguous. 
When people sign up to a social network, they agree to the social 
network’s terms of use. By agreeing to the terms, they are providing 
their consent to the network to use, collect, process, and store their 
images. By entering into a social network contract, people give their 
consent to the network to capture their photographs legitimately. 
However, people often do not understand what the consent entails.55 
Social network contracts allow personal images to be passed to 
third-party affiliates for use in advertising or marketing purposes. 
Consequently, once a person has consented to the network’s terms 
of use, their photographs and personal images—as well as the ways 
in which their images may be used—are out of their control.56 
Under the GDPR, users may withdraw their consent allowing 
social networks to process, store, and collect their data.57 Such with-
drawal of consent has particularly acute ramifications when a user 
 
52 See id. 
53 See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 49 (May 13, 2014). 
54 See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 7 (providing that a 
person can withdraw their consent). 
55 See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 1880, 1884 (2013). 
56 See generally Bernal, supra note 4; see also Ausloos, supra note 1, at 146; Fazlioglu, 
supra note 1, at 151; Mantelero, supra note 4, at 230. 
57 See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 7(3) (providing that 
“[t]he data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time”). 
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decides to terminate their social media account.58 When a user  
terminates their social network contract, the network is still able to 
use any images of the (former) user that have been reshared on the 
network—even if the user removes all of their content on their pro-
file page from the network by deleting their account. This is due to 
the fact that users agree to the social network’s terms of use which 
include the non-exclusive licensing of their content.59 The non- 
exclusive license clause provides that a social network may continue 
to use the images after the contract is terminated. This means that a 
network may be in breach of the GDPR if it continues to use peo-
ple’s images after the contract ends. Accordingly, when this occurs, 
a person would be able to use the right to be forgotten to request that 
the network remove their images from the network. 
The third situation where the right to be forgotten might apply is 
when a person objects to the processing of their data.60 A situation 
of this kind might occur, for example, when a person takes a photo-
graph of a third party who does not want their image to be shared 
online. The GDPR defines “processing” broadly as: 
any operation or set of operations which is performed 
on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether 
or not by automated means, such as collection,  
recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adapta-
tion or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclo-
sure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise 
 
58 Particularly significant are Facebook’s Terms of Service. In relation to the right to be 
forgotten, any requests from its users to erase the data would have to be erased from all of 
Facebook’s data-storage systems, not just its platform. This contravenes Facebook’s new 
Terms of Service, which also state that the network can access archived copies of users’ 
shared data despite the user deleting or deactivating their account. See, e.g., Data Policy, 
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/update [perma.cc/4JCT-M2KB]; 
Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms/ [perma.ccU7PY-
NNHQ]. 
59 See, e.g., Georgiades, supra note 2, at 436–38; VAN ALSENOY ET AL., supra note 2; 
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.
facebook.com/legal/terms/previous [perma.cc/9BH6-ECXH]; Terms of Service, TWITTER 
(Jan. 1, 2020), https://twitter.com/en/tos [perma.cc/TEX8-24WU]; Terms of Use, 
INSTAGRAM (Apr. 19, 2018), https://help.instagram.com/478745558852511 [perma.cc/
LY97-4SG3]. 
60 An objection to the processing of a data subject’s data may be aimed at a data 
controller such as a search engine like Google, or a social network site like Facebook. 
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making available, alignment or combination, re-
striction, erasure or destruction.61 
When a person takes their own photograph or a photograph of a third 
party, they are potentially “processing” data in so far as they are 
collecting and recording the image. Similarly, the uploading of an 
image on a social network page may fall within “use, disclosure, 
dissemination or otherwise making available.”62 
A fourth situation where the right to be forgotten may apply is 
where a data subject’s information is transferred for processing to a 
country outside of Europe that does not protect data to the standard 
required by European law.63 Specifically, the right to be forgotten 
allows data subjects to object if their data has been transferred to 
third countries that do not safeguard or protect the fundamental right 
to respect for private life and freedom of that right that the European 
Union law guarantees.64 Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner 
stands for this proposition, as the Court of Justice held that  
the existing safe harbor provisions which provided that a data sub-
ject’s data may be transferred to a third country were invalid.65 
 
61 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 4(2) (emphasis added). 
62 Id. 
63 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm’r, 56 I.L.M. 245, ¶ 71 (2015) (EU). 
The Court of Justice stated that:  
[A]s is apparent from the very wording of Article 25(6) of Directive 
95/46, that provision requires that a third country ‘ensures’ an adequate 
level of protection by reason of its domestic law or its international 
commitments. Secondly, according to the same provision, the 
adequacy of the protection ensured by the third country is assessed ‘for 
the protection of the private lives and basic freedoms and rights of 
individuals.’  
Id. 
64 Id. at ¶¶ 90–91 (citing C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland and Others, 
2014 E.C.R 238, ¶¶ 52–55); see also EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, art. 8 (June 1, 2010), 
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MRF-FUFJ] 
(“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.”). 
65 Schrems, 56 I.L.M. 245, at ¶ 107. In a press release outlining the decision, the Court 
of Justice noted that the Irish High Court had to examine:  
[Schrem’s] complaint with all due diligence and, at the conclusion of 
its investigation, . . . decide whether, pursuant to the directive, transfer 
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Furthermore, the Court of Justice held that a data subject may object 
to the transfer or processing of their data to a third country if it can 
be shown that the third country does not protect personal data in  
accordance with European law.66 As the Court of Justice said: 
[T]he Commission found that the United States  
authorities were able to access the personal data 
transferred from the Member States to the United 
States and process it in a way incompatible, in  
particular, with the purposes for which it was trans-
ferred, beyond what was strictly necessary and  
proportionate to the protection of national security.67 
The Court of Justice also noted that when transferring a data sub-
ject’s data to a third country, the data subject would need to have 
“administrative or judicial means of redress enabling, in particular, 
the data relating to them to be accessed and, as the case may be, 
rectified or erased.”68 Consequently, the right to be forgotten  
allows data subjects to object if their data have been transferred to 
third countries which do not safeguard or protect the fundamental 
right to private life and freedoms that are guaranteed within  
the EU.69 
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
There are a number of exceptions to Article 17 (‘the right to be 
forgotten’) in the GDPR. One of the most important exceptions is 
found in Article 80 of the GDPR, which provides an exception for 
journalists and artists for the processing of personal data and free-
dom of expression.70 This requires that a data subject’s request to 
 
of the data of Facebook’s European subscribers to the United States 
should be suspended on the ground that that country does not afford an 
adequate level of protection of personal data. 
European Commission Press Release 117/15, The Court of Justice Declares that the 
Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision Is Invalid (Oct. 6, 2015). 
66 Schrems, 56 I.L.M. 245, at ¶ 107. 
67 Id. at ¶ 90 (emphasis added). 
68 Id. (emphasis added). 
69 Id. ¶ 91. 
70 Compare General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 80, with Data 
Directive, supra note 9, at art. 9 (previous exception for “processing of personal data 
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remove data must be balanced against freedom of speech or  
expression but also the public’s interest in having access to the  
information.71 For example, as noted above, the Court in Google 
Spain v. Gonzalez held that outdated information lies beyond the 
scope of the public’s interest.72 
The balancing of freedom of expression and the right to be  
forgotten is critical when people share and exchange personal  
images on social networks. The GDPR recognizes that when  
people upload and share images within a social network, there are 
competing interests between the users who upload images, the  
users that access images, and the subjects of the images. When  
deciding how the balance between these interests is to be drawn, the 
court may take a variety of factors into account. In Google Spain v. 
Gonzalez, the court considered “the nature of the information in 
question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on 
the interest of the public in having that information, an interest 
which may vary, in particular, according to the role played by the 
data subject in public life.”73 In the case of public figures, the courts 
seem willing to give more weight to the public’s right to know than 
their ability to keep matters private, because “the interference with 
[a famous person’s] fundamental rights is justified by the prepon-
derant interest of the general public in having, on account of inclu-
sion in the list of results, access to the information in question.”74 
One of the important consequences of the right to be forgotten 
is that it enables people to regain control over their data. One of the 
main arguments against the right to be forgotten is that it threatens 
freedom of speech. It appears that if people did regain control, this 
 
carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression 
only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom 
of expression”). See also, e.g., Fazlioglu, supra note 4, at 154; Anne Flanagan, Defining 
“Journalism” in the Age of Evolving Social Media: A Questionable EU Legal Test, 21 
INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 1, 1 (2012); Mantelero, supra note 4, at 234; Giovanni Sartor, 
The Right to Be Forgotten: Balancing Interests in the Flux of Time, 24 INT’L J. L. & INFO. 
TECH. 72, 72 (2015). 
71 See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 81. 
72 Id. ¶ 98. 
73 Id. ¶ 81. 
74 Id. ¶ 97. 
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would be detrimental to a person’s freedom of expression or speech. 
The detriment potentially is attributed to overriding need to maintain 
control of the information that is uploaded by users. This is because 
every person has the right to express themselves and may do so by 
uploading images of third parties. More often, it means that people 
whose images are captured and uploaded lose their ability to control 
the use of their image because it is captured by another person who 
is the creator of the image. Thus, when images are captured and up-
loaded the use of the images is subject to the social network’s terms 
of use which means that the network controls the use of the images. 
While these concerns are valid, they often disregard the key issue 
redressed by the right to be forgotten, which is that large internet 
firms such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft have turned the 
sharing of images online into a source of advertising revenue and 
thus have developed a business model that depends on the collection 
and storage of vast quantities of personal images online.75 For  
example, in Fraley v. Facebook, the court found that Facebook’s 
Sponsored stories misappropriated users’ profile images because  
users did not explicitly agree to have their image used in connection 
to the Sponsored Stories feature.76 
Another exception that potentially restricts the operation of  
the right to be forgotten is the “personal or household purposes”  
exception. According to Article 2 of the GDPR,77 where the pro-
cessing of personal data is by a “natural person in the course of a 
purely personal or household activity,” it will fall outside the scope 
 
75 See Bernal, supra note 4. 
76 Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 803–06 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Judge Koh 
dismissed Facebook’s claim that users had consented to the use of their profile images to 
be used because the plaintiffs were “likely to be deceived likely to be deceived into 
believing [they] had full control to prevent [their] appearances in Sponsored Story 
advertisements while otherwise engaging with Facebook’s various features, such as 
clicking on a ‘Like’ button, when in fact members lack such control.” Id. at 814–15. See 
Jesse Koehler, Note, Fraley v. Facebook: The Right of Publicity in Online Social Networks, 
28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 963, 964 (2013); see also generally Francesca Grea, To Like or 
Not to Like: Fraley v. Facebook’s Impact on California’s Right of Publicity Statute in the 
Age of the Internet, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 865, 869 (2014). 
77 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 2. 
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of the Regulation.78 One example where the purely personal or 
household exception may not apply to personal data that is pro-
cessed in the course of purely personal or household activity is high-
lighted in Bodil Lindqvist v. Åklagarkammaren i Jönköping.79 The 
court in this case held that the personal or household activity excep-
tion did not apply to referring to people’s names on an internet page 
that identified them by name or by other means because the infor-
mation related to charitable and religious activities.80 However, the 
personal and household exception covers most of the activities that 
people engage in online, including uploading and sharing a personal 
image on a personal profile page.81 
The household exception predates the GDPR, as it had been  
incorporated into the 1995 European Data Directive 95/46/EC. In 
1995, the internet was in its infancy, and most people’s access to 
information was limited to written records or held on a computer 
that did not have internet.82 Given that the exception effectively  
excludes individuals from the right to be forgotten, it has very  
important consequences for how useful the right to be forgotten may 
be in protecting against online misuse of personal images.83 
 
78 Id. at art. 2(2)(c). See also Zuzanna Warso, There’s More to It Than Data Protection- 
Fundamental Rights, Privacy and the Personal/Household Exemption in the Digital Age, 
29 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 491, 491–92, 495 (2013); Wong, A Conceptual Analysis, 
supra note 47, at 147; see generally Wong, Anybody Is a Data Controller, supra note 43. 
79 Case C-101/01, Bodil Lindqvist v. Åklagarkammaren i Jönköping, 2003 E.C.R.  
I-12992, ¶ 45.  
80 Id. 
81 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Annex 2: Proposals for Amendments 
Regarding Exemption for Personal or Household Activities, EUR. COMMISSION (Feb. 27, 
2013), https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/other-document/files/2013/
20130227_statement_dp_annex2_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7A2U-BQPW] [hereinafter 
Working Party, Annex 2]. 
82 See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD), 2013, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, ¶ 27 (“In 1995, generalised access to the internet 
was a new phenomenon. . . . However, it is clear that the development of the internet into 
a comprehensive global stock of information which is universally accessible and searchable 
was not foreseen by the Community legislator.”); see also Claire Bessant, The Application 
of Directive 95/46/EC and the Data Protection Act 1998 When an Individual Posts 
Photographs of Other Individuals Online, 6 EUR. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2015). 
83 See generally Bessant, supra note 82. 
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V. REDRESSING AND REMEDYING THE MISUSE OF PERSONAL DATA 
BY COMPANIES 
Social networks increasingly intrude on people’s privacy  
because they have a “great data concentration”84 about their user’s 
online interactions. Companies such as Google, Instagram, Face-
book, Microsoft, and Twitter collect, process, and store vast 
amounts of personal data. These companies retain a significant 
amount of their users’ data which increasingly are used to intrude 
on people’s personal lives online. For example, Facebook tracks 
their users even if they are not logged into the Facebook platform; 
as such it acquires data about the user without their knowledge.85  
Social networks historically promoted “the idea that sharing infor-
mation is a social norm and that privacy or oblivion is an outdated 
concept.”86 By encouraging people to share their images and per-
sonal information, companies like Facebook, Google, and Instagram 
(to name a few) collect vast amounts of data. This collection of data 
highlights that “the same companies are progressively collecting an 
enormous amount of data in order to profile individuals and, above 
all, to extract predictive information with high economic, social,  
political and strategic value.”87 As Mantelero argues, “[i]n a world 
where it is assumed that no value is attributed to privacy and obliv-
ion, the only ones to gain from this abandonment of old rights are 
the owners of these platforms or services which have an exclusive 
and comprehensive view of the entire mass of data.”88 
Social networks “represent[] an antimony because they do not 
share the information taken from the data and, even though they give 
little value to privacy and affirm the end of oblivion (describing life 
as a timeline); they extract a high value from this data.”89 Thus, 
when social networks store and collect people’s images, the network 
 
84 Mantelero, supra note 4, at 234. 
85 See Jason Murdock, Facebook Is Tracking You Online, Even If You Don’t Have An 
Account, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 17, 2018, 6:53 AM EDT), https://www.newsweek.com/
facebook-tracking-you-even-if-you-dont-have-account-888699 [https://perma.cc/Q6AE-
XAS2]. 
86 Mantelero, supra note 4, at 234. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
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yields power over their users, because even if the user can delete 
their photographs on their profile page, they cannot control the use 
of their personal image on their friend’s profile page. As Mantelero 
suggests, the data collected and stored by social networks represents 
“not only money, but also power,” and this power in turn facilitates 
the ongoing exploitation and the expropriation of users’ data.90 The 
right to be forgotten is an “attempt to reduce the amount of data col-
lected” and this reduction would undermine the social network’s 
power.91 Mantelero states that “[f]or this reason the owners of big 
data have tried to make it more difficult to change privacy settings, 
have used technical devices to track users in a persistent way and 
have thus evoked the end of the privacy era.”92 
One of the consequences of the right to be forgotten is that it 
enables people to regain control over their data by reshifting the 
power imbalance that exists between corporations and individuals. 
The right to be forgotten illuminates the critical issue of users  
being given the right to delete the data which is controlled by  
social networks.93 These companies retain a significant amount of 
their users’ data (images), which increasingly intrudes on people’s 
personal lives and thus diminishes a user’s autonomy over their own 
image. As Bernal argues, this “kind of transfer of power, that kind 
of re-balancing, could have possibilities to redress the current  
imbalance over personal data—and to help re-establish at least some 
control that people both have lost and feel that they have lost.”94 
While the right to be forgotten is not a mechanism that will  
actually prevent the misuse of personal images, it does provide an 
ex post facto remedy for people whose personal images have been 
misused. This is because the right to be forgotten enables people to 
request that when their images have been misused they are deleted 
from the network.95 In this sense, the right to be forgotten would 
provide a practical solution for social media users as well as any 
 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 See id. 
94 Bernal, supra note 4, at 4. 
95 See discussion supra Part I. 
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third parties (who may be non-users) that object when their image is 
captured and is uploaded or shared online. 
VI. CRITICISMS OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
A number of arguments have been made against the right to be 
forgotten. Insofar as the right allows an individual to have data about 
them deleted or removed, there is a concern that it will facilitate self-
censorship.96 The fear here is that the right to be forgotten will allow 
people to rewrite history97; i.e., that it will allow people to manage 
public information in order to ensure that only certain perspectives 
of them are in the public domain.98 While there is a chance that the 
right to be forgotten may be used in this way, such use would require 
the courts to adopt a very broad reading of the type of situations 
where the right to be forgotten might be applied. On most readings,99 
such cases of “censorship” would only be allowed in limited and 
presumably justified situations, for example when the data is out-
dated, irrelevant, or when a person withdraws their consent to have 
the data published.100 
Another concern with the right to be forgotten is that it will  
restrict freedom of speech and/or expression.101 It is clear that the 
right to be forgotten will remove information from the public  
domain. In introducing the right to be forgotten the intention of the 
European legislators was not to restrict freedom of the press or free 
 
96 See Giurgiu, supra note 4, at 367–68; Koops, supra note 5, at 232; see generally 
Bennett, supra note 32; Pere Simón Castellano, The Right to Be Forgotten Under European 
Law: A Constitutional Debate, 16 LEX ELECTRONICA 1 (2012); Omer Tene & Jules 
Polonetsky, Privacy In the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 63 (2012); Smet, supra note 32; Weber, supra note 32. 
97 See generally Bennett, supra note 32; Smet, supra note 32; Tene & Polonetsky, supra 
note 96; Weber, supra note 32. 
98 Some scholars argue that the right to be forgotten needs to be framed in a different 
language, such as “the right to delete.” See, e.g., Bernal, supra note 4; see generally 
Bennett, supra note 32; Smet, supra note 32; Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 96; Weber, 
supra note 32. 
99 See generally Julia Powles, The Case That Won’t Be Forgotten, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
583, 586–90, 606–10 (2015); Lawrence Siry, Forget Me, Forget Me Not: Reconciling Two 
Different Paradigms of the Right to Be Forgotten, 103 KY. L.J. 311, 328–31 (2015). 
100 See generally Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección 
de Datos (AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317; Bennett, supra note 32; Bernal, supra note 4;  Smet, 
supra note 32; Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 96; Weber, supra note 32. 
101 See Koops, supra note 5, at 238–39. 
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speech; rather it was to protect an equally important right: personal 
privacy. Given that the GDPR includes an exception for free speech, 
it seems that many of the complaints about free speech are about the 
balancing of the rights and where the line is to be drawn. Any risk 
to free speech or freedom of the press has been incorporated into the 
GDPR and any requests must be balanced against freedom of ex-
pression and the public interests.102 
A number of other problems exist with the right to be forgotten; 
one of which is that there are many aspects of the new regulation 
and its application that are uncertain. The right to be forgotten itself 
is not problematic, but the application of the right may potentially 
give rise to problems. For example, when personal images are mis-
used online, it is unclear whether the social network or the individual 
would be responsible for removing the image.103 This is important 
because the data subject may not be the owner of the image and 
would need to seek permission from the copyright owner or social 
network to remove the photograph on their behalf. For example, 
when a person captures an image of a third party in a photograph, 
the creation of the image gives rise to copyright protection. As such 
 
102 This is because there are a number of exceptions to the right to be forgotten as stated 
in General Data Protection Regulation, art. 17(3), which provides: 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 will not apply to the extent of the processing is 
necessary: 
1) for exercising the right of freedom of expression and 
information; 
2) for compliance with a legal obligation which requires 
processing by Union or Member State law to which the 
controller is subject or for the performance of a task carried 
out in the public interest or in the exercise of official 
authority vested in the controller; 
3) for reasons of public interest in the area of public health in 
accordance with points (h) and (i) of Article 9(2) as well as 
Article 9(3); 
4) for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or 
historical research purposes or statistical purposes in 
accordance with Article 89(1) in so far as the right referred 
to in paragraph 1 is likely to render impossible or seriously 
impair the achievement of the objectives of that processing; 
or 
5) for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims. 
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 17(3). 
103 Id. at art. 17(1). 
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it is the creator of the image and not the subject that owns the copy-
right.104 This means that the subject in the image may not have a 
right to remove their image from a third-party profile page.105 As a 
result, it may be unclear whether the data subject has a claim on the 
copyright owner to remove their image from their personal profile 
page. It is also uncertain whether the data subject has a claim on the  
social network provider to remove their image from the network.106 
The distribution of responsibilities in the removal of data is “not 
particularly clear, since both the SNS provider and the user/uploader 
are being designated as data controllers in the standard interpretation 
of the Directive.”107 
Another problem with the right to be forgotten relates to the 
scope of the personal or household purpose exception.108 The prob-
lem with Article 2 of the GDPR is that it is unclear “whether an 
individual posting personal data openly for a worldwide, unre-
stricted audience can still be considered to be processing the data for 
personal or household purposes.”109 This is because a person who 
disseminates an image on a social network may still fall within a 
personal or household purpose.110 
Another uncertainty that may arise with the right to be forgotten 
is the way in which the right will apply in relation to photographs, 
as distinct from written information. Although photographs clearly 
will fall within the definition of “data,” it is less clear to predict 
whether a photograph will trigger the right to be removed. For  
example, it is not clear what will need to change for a photograph to 
be declared “irrelevant,” “inadequate,” or “excessive.”111 Most of 
 
104 See generally Eugenia Georgiades, The Limitations of Copyright: Sharing Personal 
Images on Social Networks, 40 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 230 (2018). 
105 See id. 
106 See Koops, supra note 5, at 239. 
107 Id. at 238 (citing Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2010 on the 
Concepts of “Controller" and "Processor” (2010), at 21). 
108 See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 2(c). 
109 Working Party, Annex 2, supra note 81, at 3. 
110 See Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Oblivion: The Right to Be Different . . . From 
Oneself: Reproposing The Right to Be Forgotten, 13 REVISTA DE LOS ESTUDIOS DE 
DERECHO Y CIENCIA POLÍTICA DE LA UOC 122, 128 (Feb. 2012). 
111 See Google Spain v. Gonzalez: 
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the examples given where the right to be forgotten applies are in 
relation to textual data—newspapers stories and the like—not  
photographs.112 While this is an issue that needs clarification, it 
would seem that photographs are capable of triggering the right to 
be forgotten in certain situations. It will be more difficult to establish 
the criteria required for applying a right to be forgotten for a photo-
graph than it is with textual data. Although the right to be forgotten 
may not be exercised in relation to trivial matters such as changes in 
fashion or a bad haircut, it may apply where a photograph presents 
factual information that later becomes irrelevant or where the image 
contains sensitive data.113 For example, a photograph could contain 
 
It follows from those requirements, laid down in Article 6(1)(c) to (e) 
of Directive 95/46, that even initially lawful processing of accurate 
data may, in the course of time, become incompatible with the directive 
where those data are no longer necessary in the light of the purposes 
for which they were collected or processed. That is so in particular 
where they appear to be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, 
or excessive in relation to those purposes and in the light of the time 
that has elapsed.  
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), 
2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 93; see also General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at 
Recital 65 (“A data subject should have the right to have personal data concerning him or 
her rectified and a ‘right to be forgotten’ where the retention of such data infringes this 
Regulation or Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject. In particular, 
a data subject should have the right to have his or her personal data erased and no longer 
processed where the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for 
which they are collected or otherwise processed, where a data subject has withdrawn his 
or her consent or objects to the processing of personal data concerning him or her, or 
where the processing of his or her personal data does not otherwise comply with this 
Regulation.”) (emphasis added). 
112 See Rhiannon Williams, Telegraph Stories Affected by the EU ‘Right to Be 
’Forgotten,’ TELEGRAPH (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/
11036257/Telegraph-stories-affected-by-EU-right-to-be-forgotten.html [https://perma.cc/
NT2Y-8X2P] (demonstrating that most of stories in The Telegraph affected by the right to 
be forgotten pertain to articles rather than photographs); see generally Philip Delves 
Broughton, Four Years for British Convent Girl Who Ran a Ring of 600 Call Girls, 
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 24, 2003), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/4190437/Four-
years-for-British-convent-girl-who-ran-a-ring-of-600-call-girls.html [https://perma.cc/
MS7K-9HRE]; Italian Job Stunt Lands Mini Driver a Ban, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 10, 2008, 
8:26 PM GMT), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/3419280/
Italian-Job-stunt-lands-Mini-driver-a-ban.html [https://perma.cc/8YMP-DTQT]. 
113 For example, four images had been removed from The Telegraph. The images in 
question relate to Max Mosley’s 2008 sex scandal. See generally Williams, supra note 112. 
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information concerning a person’s political views or revealing  
information about their health.114 
The right to be forgotten raises a number of practical issues. One 
issue is that the removal of images may be difficult to implement.115 
Even though a network may remove an image, it may still be possi-
ble to view the image online.116 This is because it may take some 
time to remove the image from the cache memory, or the  
images may be stored on a person’s hard drive or in the cloud.117 As 
Ausloos says, even if “notice and take down procedures might take 
content out of the (public) sight,” it does not result in the removal of 
the images from the data user’s servers.118 Even if a person chooses 
to remove their images from their own profile page, the image may 
still be available if the image has been shared and reshared. These 
problems are exacerbated by the global nature of the internet, which 
may place images in jurisdictions with little or no protection. There 
is little use in demanding an image be removed in one country if 
users can simply obtain the image from another country. 
VII. SHOULD OTHER COUNTRIES ADOPT THE RIGHT TO BE 
FORGOTTEN? 
A. Imagining an Australian Right to Be Forgotten 
If a right to be forgotten were adopted in Australia, it would help 
to restore the imbalance between people whose images are captured 
 
114 See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at rec. 10; see also Data 
Directive, supra note 9, at art. 2. 
115 See Cecile de Terwangne, Internet Privacy and the Right to Be Forgotten/Right to 
Oblivion, 13 REVISTA DE INTERNET, DERECHO Y POLÍTICA 109, 117 (2012); see also 
generally Kathryn Smith, The Right to Be Forgotten: Legislating for Individuals to Regain 
Control of Their Personal Information on Social Networks, 7(1) REINVENTION (2014). 
116 See Terwangne, supra note 115, at 117. 
117 See id. 
118 Ausloos, supra note 1, at 148. Ausloos states that while European citizens can request 
Facebook to send them all personal data in Facebook’s possession, Facebook still keeps 
track of your removed data as well. See Omer Tene, Privacy: The New Generations, 1 
INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 15, 25 (2010); see also generally Meg Leta Ambrose & Jef 
Ausloos, The Right to Be Forgotten Across the Pond, 3 J. INFO POL’Y 1 (2013). 
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and those who control the data.119 An Australian version of this right 
would also enable people to regain control over their images on  
social networks. If introduced it “could give individuals the possi-
bility of more control over their data and hence more autonomy. It 
could directly reduce the amount of data that is held—hence that is 
vulnerable—as individuals exercise their right to delete.”120 An 
Australian right to be forgotten would also address broader privacy 
concerns with respect to social networks. It would help to respond 
to the fact that social networks increasingly chip away at personal 
privacy. Particularly concerning is the way that people’s personal 
images are prone to misuse by those who collect information, as the 
data can be aggregated and combined with other forms of data, 
which can then be used for profiling.121 
It is arguable that the right to be forgotten might also force social 
networks to justify why they are holding information.122 As  
Bernal said: 
It could force those holding data to justify why 
they’re holding it—in such a way that the data sub-
jects understand, for if data subjects cannot under-
stand why the data is wanted, they might simply  
delete it. If there is a benefit and that benefit is made 
clear, why would an individual wish to delete that 
data? Most importantly of all, the fact that data could 
be deleted at any time could encourage the develop-
ment of business models that do not rely on the hold-
ing of so much personal data.123 
Insofar that the right to be forgotten “reflects a paradigm shift” in 
privacy, where the individuals have “power[, they] . . . can and 
 
119 See generally Paul De Hert & Vagelis Papakonstantinou, The Proposed Data 
Protection Regulation Replacing 95/46/EC: A Sound System for the Protection of 
Individuals, 28 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 130 (2012); Jasmine McNealy, The 
Emerging Conflict Between Newsworthiness and the Right to Be Forgotten, 39 N. KY. L. 
REV. 119 (2012); Robert Kirk Walker, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 257 
(2012). 
120 Bernal, supra note 4. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. 
123 Id. 
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should restrict the actions of those who might oppress, abuse or take  
advantage of those individuals.”124 This right would help individuals 
to regain control over how their personal images are used. For too 
long, in American culture and to some extent Australian culture,  
privacy interests have been overshadowed by, or come second to, 
freedom of expression and speech. As it stands, a right to be forgot-
ten would be useful in Australia because it would potentially close 
some of the gaps in the existing legal protection for personal images. 
While there is some legal protection, the protection is fragmented 
and piecemeal under federal and common law. For example, the 
Australian Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) does not protect personal images 
that are uploaded by individuals.125 An aggrieved person would need 
to seek a remedy under other areas of law such as copyright or tort— 
for example, the tort of breach of confidence. However, it should be 
noted that the tort of breach of confidence may only protect personal 
images, if the misuse of the image relates to matters of an intimate 
or sexual nature. Presently, Australian law provides specific protec-
tion for certain types of images such as those of an intimate (and/or 
of a sexual) nature. Despite this, there is no recognized image right 
or a right to one’s image, which leaves people vulnerable and  
unprotected when an image is captured and uploaded by a third 
party. In particular, a right to be forgotten would enable people to 
control use of their image, particularly when it is shared by other 
people on social networks.126 Incorporating a right to be forgotten in 
the Australian Privacy Act would provide people with similar  
 
124 Id. 
125 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 
126 Virginia Da Cunha is an Argentinian singer, dancer, model and actress who had posted 
various pictures of herself in short shorts, swimsuits, tank tops, and at least one sexually 
provocative pose on Twitter and Facebook. She sued Yahoo Argentina for linking and 
showing results of her name and image to websites offering sexual content, pornography, 
escorts, and other related activities. See Juzgado de Primera Instancia [1A INST.] [Court of 
First Instance], 29/7/2009, “Da Cunha, Virginia c. Yahoo de Argentina s/ Daños y 
Perjuicos,” (Resulta, I, para. 3) (Arg.) [hereinafter Opinion of Judge Simari]. Da Cunha 
was successful at first instance; however, she lost on appeal in 2010. See Cámara Nacional 
de Apelaciones en lo Civil de la Capital Federal [CNCiv.] [National Court of Civil Appeals 
of the Federal Capital], sala D, 10/8/2010, “Da Cunha Virginia c/ Yahoo de Argentina SRL 
y otro s/ Daños y Perjuicios,” (Arg.); see also generally Edward L. Carter, Argentina’s 
Right to Be Forgotten, 27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 23 (2013). 
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privacy rights to European citizens who have clearer and stronger 
data protection.   
A right to be forgotten could be adopted in Australia by amend-
ing the Australian Privacy Act and the Australian Privacy Principles 
(APPs) to include “data subject” protection rights similar to the 
EU’s GDPR.127 Incorporating data subject rights in Australia’s  
Privacy Act would provide more relief for people when their image 
is misused. 
As noted in Part III, infra, the GDPR allows a person to object 
to the transfer of their data to another country when the standard of 
data protection is not to the European standard.128 The Australian 
Privacy Act has a similar provision under the Australian Privacy 
Principles (APPs) that relates to cross-border disclosure of personal 
information.129 However, it is uncertain whether the Australian  
Privacy Principle 8 would provide adequate protection to prevent an 
Australian national’s data from being disclosed to a third-party 
country, because the text is silent on whether the disclosure of  
the information to a third party would constitute a “transfer.” Aus-
tralian Privacy Principle 8 provides that, prior to any disclosure of 
personal information to an overseas recipient, there must be reason-
able steps taken to ensure that the overseas recipient does not breach 
the Australian Privacy Principles.130 What is “reasonable” is not  
defined in the legislation which makes it difficult for determining 
whether a person in Australia would have the same rights as  
European citizens. Moreover, where data is processed and stored 
overseas, it may also be difficult to prove that data is processed,  
collected, or stored in Australia, or by an Australian corporation. 
Consequently, provisions similar to Article 21 of the GDPR, i.e., the 
 
127 See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 4(1). 
128 See generally id. 
129 See Australian Privacy Principles (Cth) c 8 (July 2019) (Austl.), https://www.oaic.
gov.au/agencies-and-organisations/app-guidelines/chapter-8-app-8-cross-border-
disclosure-of-personal-information [https://perma.cc/99CE-NH9M]. 
130 Id. (“[B]efore an APP entity discloses personal information about an individual to an 
overseas recipient, the entity must take reasonable steps to ensure that the recipient does 
not breach the APPs in relation to that information. Where an entity discloses personal 
information to an overseas recipient, it is accountable for an act or practice of the overseas 
recipient that would breach the APPs (s 16C).”). 
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right to object to the transfer of personal data, should be adopted  
in Australia. 
B. Imagining a Right to be Forgotten in the United States 
Over the years, many legal scholars have argued against adopt-
ing a right to be forgotten in the United States because it would  
oppress freedom of expression and speech.131 Given the serious data 
breaches that occurred with Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica scan-
dal,132 and at Equifax,133 there has been a stronger accountability put 
towards American companies which operate services in  
Europe. In particular, data breaches that have occurred in Europe 
have alerted American legislators towards recognizing the need for 
stronger privacy protection for personal data.134 Consequently, data 
breaches that occurred in Europe have impacted the United States 
by demonstrating the need for stronger data privacy protection.135 
American companies that provide online services to European  
citizens and operate in Europe must comply with the GDPR. For 
example, in Europe, Google received over 2.5 million requests for 
data erasure since the right to be forgotten was introduced in 
2014.136 As a result of Google Spain v. Gonzalez,137 the European 
 
131 See generally Eltis, supra note 32; McGoldbrick, supra note 32; Smet, supra note 32; 
Daniel J. Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087 (2002); Daniel J. 
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477, 564 (2006); Daniel J. Solove, 
The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE 
L. J. 967 (2003); Weber, supra note 32. 
132 See Emma Graham-Harrison & Carole Cadwalladr, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook 
Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica in Major Data Breach, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-
influence-us-election [https://perma.cc/9R8J-NZVC]. 
133 See Seena Gressin, The Equifax Data Breach: What to Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N 
(Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/09/equifax-data-breach-what-do 
[https://perma.cc/KJ6S-ZKX6]. 
134 See Hillary C. Webb, Note, People Don’t Forget: The Necessity of Legislating 
Guidance in Implementing a U.S Right to Be Forgotten, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1304, 
1331 (2017). 
135 See generally id. 
136 Stuart Lauchlan, The EU’s Right to Be Forgotten Should Stay Within the EU—An 
Important Legal Opinion in a Fake News World, DIGINOMICA (Jan. 13, 2019), 
https://diginomica.com/the-eus-right-to-be-forgotten-should-stay-within-the-eu-an-
important-legal-opinion-in-a-fake-news-world [https://perma.cc/T6FK-NZH2]. 
137 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317 (May 13, 2014). 
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Court of Justice introduced the right for people to be able to request 
that their data be removed. While companies such as Facebook and 
Google have to comply with the requirements of the GDPR in  
Europe, non-European citizens are not afforded the same level of 
data protection.138 
In the United States, data protection laws remain stagnant  
because the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is the main venue 
for most privacy policy making.139 The United States does not have 
a designated data protection agency similar to those created by the 
GDPR, and the courts in the United States “mainly rule on the con-
stitutionality of regulations, legislation, and government actions.”140 
Despite playing an active role in data protection, the FTC’s authority 
is limited to data breaches that fall within the scope of prohibiting 
unfair or deceptive practices.141 Leticia Bode and Leta Jones note 
that the FTC is “limited to enforcement of unfair or deceptive data 
practices, generally tied to the terms of service drafted and published 
by the data collectors and controllers and drafting policy recommen-
dations and reports.”142 This in effect limits the authority of the FTC 
to particular circumstances of data breaches that arise out of unfair 
or deceptive practices.143 
The U.S. Constitution enables the various States to develop and 
implement privacy protection under their respective law.144 Each 
State incorporates the protection of image rights either under statute 
 
138 See Case C-507/17, Google Inc. v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et des 
libertés (CNIL), 2019 E.C.R. 772 (Sept. 24, 2019) (limiting the right to be forgotten to only 
EU countries). 
139 See Leticia Bode & Meg Leta Jones, Ready to Forget: American Attitudes Toward the 
Right to Be Forgotten, 33 INFO. SOC’Y 76, 77 (2017) (citing Daniel Solove & Woodrow 
Harzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600 
(2014)). 
140 Id. 
141 See Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006); see also Bode & 
Jones, supra note 139. 
142 See Bode & Jones, supra note 139, at 77. 
143 In In re Snapchat, the FTC held that Snapchat’s claims that images would disappear 
were false. Decision & Order, In re Snapchat, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4501 (Dec. 23, 
2014); see also F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d. 236 (3d Cir. 2015) (hotel 
chain failed to protect customers’ personal information stored on their information 
systems). 
144 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
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or through common law.145 In their seminal work, Warren and 
Brandeis argued for the protection of people’s privacy as photog-
raphy and photographic equipment evolved.146 Concerned that the 
development of photography intruded on people’s lives, Warren  
and Brandeis attempted to protect image rights under the tort of  
privacy.147 Building upon Warren and Brandeis’ tort of privacy, 
William Prosser identified four torts for invasions of privacy.148 
These torts are as follows: 
(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or 
solitude or into his private affairs; 
(2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts 
about the plaintiff; 
(3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light 
in the public eye; and 
(4) appropriation for the defendant’s advantage, of 
the plaintiff’s name or likeness.149 
At the state level, a person may draw upon either of the four torts 
to protect specific invasions of privacy150 if the state has incorpo-
rated them in their common law. The most relevant of the four torts 
which more closely relates to personal images is the appropriation 
of a person’s likeness, also known as the right of publicity.151 For 
example, Californian courts do protect personal images in the way 
of personality rights; however, the protection is limited and balanced 
with freedom of speech.152 The courts provide that “no cause of  
action will lie for the ‘[p]ublication of matters in the public interest, 
which rests on the right of the public to know and the freedom of the 
 
145 See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
146 See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. 
L. REV. 193 (1890). 
147 Id. at 195–96 (citing Marion Manola v. Stevens & Myers, N.Y. Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 15, 18, 21, 1890)). 
148 See Prosser, supra note 145, at 389. 
149 Id.; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 146, at 197. 
150 Prosser, supra note 145, at 386–87. 
151 Fraley v. Facebook Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 796–97 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
152 Id. at 805 (users were identified as “subjects of public interest among the same 
audience”) (citing Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001)); 
see also generally Grea, supra note 76. 
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press to tell it. . . .’”153 While there is some protection of privacy in 
relation to privacy of communications,154 more often it is balanced 
against the public’s interest in knowing when the information relates 
to matters of public concern.155 Further, the creation of an image 
(personal or otherwise) is protected under copyright and thus more 
readily protected under the First Amendment.156 
This is not to suggest that the U.S. Constitution provides no  
privacy protection. Rather, this protection is limited. For example, 
there is protection for people’s privacy against intrusions by govern-
ment.157 Even though the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly pro-
vide for a right to privacy for breaches of privacy between individ-
uals,158 the FTC does offer some protection in certain circumstances 
against breaches of personal information.159 However, in the context 
of privacy protection for misuses of personal images, the protection 
is limited to each individual state’s common law or statute. It can be 
argued that whenever there are competing interests between privacy 
and a creator’s freedom of expression, the courts traditionally favor 
 
153 Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790, 793 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995) (quoting Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 417 (Cal Ct. App. 
1983)); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2012); Amy Morganstern, In the 
Spotlight: Social Network Advertising and the Right of Publicity, 12 INTELL. PROP. L. 
BULLETIN 181, 191 (2008); Koehler, supra note 76, at 984 (2013). Koehler further states 
that “because California’s right of publicity statute prevents a commercial speaker from 
inappropriately using an individual’s name or likeness and thus places a strain on what a 
speaker can say, the right of publicity can conflict with the First Amendment’s free speech 
and freedom of the press clauses.” Id. at 974–75. 
154 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (broadcaster published a true 
recording of a conversation albeit embarrassing); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 
(1975) (name of a rape victim was published); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (the 
real names of juvenile offenders were published); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 
46 (1988) (same); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (same). 
155 See generally Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514. 
156 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60–61 (1884); see also 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903). 
157 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
158 See Siry, supra note 99. 
159 See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006); see also Bode & Jones, 
supra note 139, at 77. See Decision & Order, In re Snapchat, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-
4501 (Dec. 23, 2014); see also F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d 
Cir. 2015). 
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freedom of expression over privacy as it is a constitutional right  
under the First Amendment.160 
Freedom of the press is given precedence in instances when 
there are competing interests between privacy and freedom of the 
press to report news.161 There is a willingness to strike a more bal-
anced approach between the right to privacy and the public’s right 
to know, as highlighted in Virgil v. Time Inc,162 where Judge  
Merrill stated: 
Does the spirit of the Bill of Rights require that  
individuals be free to pry into the unnewsworthy pri-
vate affairs of their fellowmen? In our view it does 
not. In our view, fairly defined areas of privacy must 
have the protection of law if the quality of life is to 
continue to be reasonably acceptable. The public’s 
right to know is, then, subject to reasonable limita-
tions so far as concerns the private facts of its indi-
vidual members.163 
 
160 See Siry, supra note 99. 
161 See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding that the publication of a 
rape victim’s name by a newspaper was lawfully obtained) (“We do not hold that truthful 
publication is automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal 
privacy within which the State may protect the individual from intrusion by the press, or 
even that a State may never punish publication of the name of a victim of a sexual offense. 
We hold only that where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully 
obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a 
state interest of the highest order, and that no such interest is satisfactorily served by 
imposing liability under § 794.03 to appellant under the facts of this case.”). However, 
White, J., dissenting from the majority, stated:  
Of course, the right to privacy is not absolute. Even the article widely 
relied upon in cases vindicating privacy rights, Warren & Brandeis, 
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), recognized that this 
right inevitably conflicts with the public’s right to know about matters 
of general concern—and that sometimes, the latter must trump the 
former. Id. at 214–15. Resolving this conflict is a difficult matter, and 
I fault the Court not for attempting to strike an appropriate balance 
between the two, but rather, fault it for according too little weight to 
B. J. F.’s side of equation, and too much on the other.  
Id. at 551 (emphasis added). 
162 Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975). 
163 Id. at 1128; see also Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 524. 
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Despite having rich tort law to draw upon, when a plaintiff’s  
privacy interests conflict with a defendant’s freedom of expression, 
privacy protection is often weakened.164 As Judge Renwick  
remarked in Foster v. Svenson, there are limitations to New York 
State’s statutory privacy tort because the court is “constrained to 
find that the invasion of privacy of one’s home that took place here 
is not actionable as a statutory tort of invasion of privacy pursuant 
to sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law.”165 New York State 
Senator Kevin Thomas proposed a Bill known as the New York Pri-
vacy Act (“NYPA”) to strengthen privacy rights in New York.166 
The NYPA attempts to rebalance the scales between protecting free-
dom of expression and privacy rights of users where their data have 
been misused or used when the information is outdated or no longer 
relevant.167 However, although the NYPA was introduced in May 
2019,168 the bill did not receive a floor vote and has not progressed 
beyond the committee stage.169 
While there is some common ground between the basis for 
privacy protection in both European and American courts, there are 
signficant differences in the ways that privacy protection is 
implemented in these jurisdictions. One such difference is that the 
European perspective of developing data protection laws is 
 
164 Bode & Jones, supra note 139, at 77. 
165 Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150, 152 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). 
166 S.B. 5642, 242nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (“An act to amend the general business 
law, in relation to the management and oversight of personal data . . . . This act may be known 
and cited as ‘New York Privacy Act.’”). Senator Kevin Thomas proposed the Bill; however, the 
Bill did not successfully pass. See Kathryn Lundstrom, New York’s Privacy Bill Failed Last 
Session, ADWEEK: DATA & PRIVACY (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.adweek.com/digital/new-
yorks-privacy-bill-failed-last-session-but-it-gives-us-a-look-at-what-future-laws-might-look-
like/ [https://perma.cc/WS6R-PJ5X ]. 
167 See Louis Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century’s Developments, 39 MICH. L. REV. 
526, 540 (1941); see also Samantha Barbas, From Privacy to Publicity: The Tort of 
Appropriation in the Age of Mass Consumption, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1119, 1119 (2013); Grea, 
supra note 76; Alison C. Storella, It’s Selfie-Evident: Spectrums of Alienability and 
Copyrighted Content on Social Media, 94 B.U. L. REV 2045, 2069 (2014); W. Mack 
Webner & Leigh Ann Lindquist, Transformation: The Bright Line Between Commercial 
Publicity Rights and the First Amendment, 37 U. AKRON L. REV. 171, 188 (2004); W.A.C., The 
Right of Privacy in News Photographs, 44 VA. L. REV. 1303, 1315 (1958). 
168 See S.B. 5642. 
169 See Sen. Kevin Thomas, Legislation, N.Y. ST. SENATE, https://www.nysenate.gov/
senators/kevin-thomas/legislation [https://perma.cc/FCL2-424G]; see also S.B. 5642. 
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entrenched in various legislation. For example, the European 
Charter of Human Rights provides that individuals have the right to 
private life.170 The GDPR further strengthens this right by protecting 
a person’s right to control their data.171 Whilst ensuring that privacy 
rights need to be balanced with freedom of expression, the leg-
islation incorporates freedom of expression as an exception as to 
when privacy rights can be exercised.172 In fact, European courts 
have considered the competing interests between one person’s pri-
vacy interests and another’s freedom of expression.173 
On the contrary, there is no singular piece of legislation that 
protects privacy in the United States. Rather, freedom of expression 
is protected and valued above privacy interests as it is part of the 
First Amendment of U.S. Constitution.174 Conseqently, in situations 
where there are competing intests between a person’s privacy and 
another person’s freedom of expression, American courts err in 
favor of freedom of expression.175 Therefore, the protection of 
freedom of expression and freedom of speech has eroded the privacy 
interests that Warren and Brandeis recognized in tort law.176 
The expanding mass media, and the widespread use of social 
networks, have highlighted the imbalance between individual 
privacy and freedom of expression in American law and American 
life. Webb argues that “characterizing the emergence of a balancing 
approach in the U.S constitutional law as erosion misses the 
 
170 See EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 64. 
171 See sources cited supra note 32. 
172 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.  
173 For example, in Von Hannover v. Germany, Princess Caroline of Monaco campaigned 
to prevent publications of photographs taken without her consent while going about her 
everyday life: going shopping, going horse riding, eating, holidaying, tripping on the beach. 
Von Hannover v. Germany (No.1), App No. 59320/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 24, 2004); see 
also N. A. Moreham, Privacy in Public Places, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 606, 607, 614 (2006). 
174 See Richard J. Peltz-Steele, The New American Privacy, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L., 365, 384, 
409–10 (2013); see also Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150, 161 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); 
Amy Gajda, Privacy, Press, and the Right to Be Forgotten in the United States, 93 WASH. 
L. REV. 201, 238–43 (2018). 
175 See Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150, 161 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).  
176 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 146, at 197 (tort of intrusion upon seclusion, tort 
of public disclosure of private fact, false light and appropriation); see also Prosser, supra 
note 145, at 389 (Prosser made the subdivision); Mantelero, supra note 4, at 229–35, 230. 
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mark.”177 This is because “[s]hifts in U.S law are necessary to avoid 
staleness and obsolescence in light of new technologies and 
changing worldviews.”178 Where information centers on public 
officials or public figures, an American court is very likely to favor 
freedom of the press over personal privacy, especially if the  
matters reported are highly newsworthy and likely to be in the  
public’s interest.179 
Although personal images may be protected under American tort 
law to some extent, there are gaps in the existing law when a third 
party captures a person’s image in a photograph. As the New York 
Appellate Division noted in Foster v. Svenson: 
[A]cknowledging that Civil Rights Law sections 50 
and 51 reflect a careful balance of a person’s right to 
privacy against the public’s right to a free flow of 
ideas, plaintiffs argue that defendant’s work should 
not be entitled to First Amendment protection  
because of the manner or context in which it was 
formed or made. In essence, plaintiffs seem to be  
arguing that the manner in which the photographs 
were obtained constitutes the extreme and outra-
geous conduct contemplated by the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and serves to over-
come the First Amendment protection contemplated 
by Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51.180 
In America, freedom of expression has become paramount to any 
privacy right, especially when the photograph is artistic or newswor-
thy.181 This is particularly the case when people are captured in 
 
177 Webb, supra note 134, at 1331. 
178 Id. (“These shifts require the ebb and flow of certain rights and liberties to parallel 
and reflect the values citizens place on those principles while the spirit of the U.S 
Constitution remains fixed.”); see also Mantelero, supra note 4, at 238–43. 
179 See Mantelero, supra note 4, at 229–35; see also Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 
Cal. App. 2d 111, 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (involving the invasion of privacy of a public 
person). 
180 Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 161 (emphasis added).  
181 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60–61 (1884); Bleistein 
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903); see also Storella, supra 
note 167, at 2051–52; Gajda, supra note 174, at 238–43. 
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photographs by third parties, as was the case in Foster v. Svenson.182 
In that case, Svenson was a photographer who used a high-powered 
lens to capture different photographs of his neighbours (the Fosters) 
and their children playing, sleeping, and undressing in their home.183 
The Fosters’ claims for invasion of privacy were unsuccesful 
because the images were protected as artistic works.184 
While it makes plaintiffs cringe to think their private lives and 
images of their small children can find their way into the public fo-
rum of an art exhibition, there is no redress under the current laws 
of the State of New York. “Simply, an individual’s right to privacy 
under the New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51 yield [sic] 
to an artist’s protections under the First Amendment under the cir-
cumstances presented here.”185 
However, the appellate court highlighted the gaps in the way that 
tort law protected personal images in the United States: 
New technologies can track thought, movement, and 
intimacies, and expose them to the general public, 
often in an instant. This public apprehension over 
new technologies invading one’s privacy became a 
reality for the plaintiffs and their neighbors when a 
photographer, using a high powered camera lens 
inside his own apartment, took photographs through 
the window into the interior of apartments in a 
neighboring building. The people who were being 
photographed had no idea this was happening. This 
case highlights the limitations of New York’s 
statutory privacy tort as a means of redressing harm 
that may be caused by this type of technological 
home invasion and exposure of private life. We are 
constrained to find that the invasion of privacy of 
one’s home that took place here is not actionable as 
a statutory tort of invasion of privacy pursuant to 
 
182 See Foster v. Svenson, No. 651826/2013, 2013 WL 3989038, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Aug. 5, 2013). 
183 See id.; see also Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 152–53. 
184 See Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 163. 
185 Foster, 2013 WL 3989038, at *1. 
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sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law, because 
defendant’s use of the images in question constituted 
art work and, thus is not deemed “use for advertising 
or trade purposes,” within the meaning of the 
statute.186 
The court further acknowledged that U.S. law did not address situa-
tions where people are photographed in the privacy of their own 
homes: 
Undoubtedly, like plaintiffs, many people would be 
rightfully offended by the intrusive manner in which 
the photographs were taken in this case. However, 
such complaints are best addressed to the Legisla-
ture—the body empowered to remedy such inequi-
ties. Needless to say, as illustrated by the troubling 
facts here, in these times of heightened threats to pri-
vacy posed by new and ever more invasive technol-
ogies, we call upon the Legislature to revisit this im-
portant issue, as we are constrained to apply the law 
as it exists.187 
There are some similarities between Australian and American 
privacy protection, which is due to a fragmented approach of  
protecting privacy interests. As commonly known, there are incon-
sistencies of privacy protection among the various States in  
America.188 These inconsistencies may be viewed as a double-edged 
sword, where the inconsistency may serve as a vehicle for potential 
state law reform, but people in other states are left without the same 
rights. It is also uncertain whether other states would follow and 
adopt into their state legislation another state’s law reform. A lack 
of uniformity means that state laws vary and may not adequately 
protect people’s privacy. 
One difference between Australia and the United States is that 
despite having a fragmented approach to the protection of personal 
images, Australia has legislation at the federal level which, despite 
 
186 Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 152 (emphasis added). 
187 Id. at 163 (citations omitted). 
188 See generally Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
203 (1954). 
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having gaps, may make it easier to propose law reform to align with 
the GDPR. Notably, since the emergence of the right to be forgotten, 
the State of New York has introduced a bill for a Privacy Act,189 
which could potentially align with Europe’s GDPR. The proposed 
Privacy Act would empower New Yorkers to sue companies directly 
over privacy violations.190 
In particular, the proposed New York Privacy Act could pave 
the way for privacy reform in other states. For example, there are 
serious claims against Facebook for privacy breaches in other states 
like Illinois.191 Following numerous data breaches, companies such 
as Facebook have been fraught with privacy claims. Similar situa-
tions have occurred in European countries such as France, where 
Facebook and Google have been fined by privacy regulatory bodies 
because of their failure to protect their users’ privacy.192 
CONCLUSION 
The right to be forgotten has the potential to re-shift the power 
imbalance that social networks hold over their users’ images by  
enabling the users to regain some control. As Bernal argues, “That 
kind of transfer of power, that kind of re-balancing, could have pos-
sibilities to redress the current imbalance over personal data—and 
to help re-establish at least some control that people have lost and 
feel that they have lost.”193 An alternative view is that the the right 
to be forgotten does not in fact restrict freedom of speech, but that  
[The] concept of the right to be forgotten is based on 
the fundamental need of an individual to determine 
the development of his life in an autonomous way, 
without being perpetually or periodically stigmatized 
as a consequence of a specific action performed in 
 
189 See S.B. 5642, 242nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). 
190 See Karl Bode, New York State’s Privacy Law Would Be Among the Toughest in the 
US, TECHDIRT (June 6, 2019), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20190605/07035842338/
new-york-states-privacy-law-would-be-among-toughest-us.shtml [https://perma.cc/76KJ-
5QKE]. 
191 See, e.g., Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 2019). 
192 See Alex Hern, Google Fined Record £44m by French Data Protection Watchdog, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jan/21/google-
fined-record-44m-by-french-data-protection-watchdog [https://perma.cc/4Z3T-66HD]. 
193 Bernal, supra note 4. 
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the past, especially when these events occurred many 
years ago and do not have any relationship with the 
contemporary context.194  
This is particularly the case where the right to be forgotten is 
balanced against freedom of the press.195 As noted by the European 
Court of Justice,  
[The] balance may however depend, in specific 
cases, on the nature of the information in question 
and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life 
and on the interest of the public in having that 
information, an interest which may vary, in 
particular, according to the role played by the data 
subject in public life.196 
When people are photographed, their images are captured and 
their ability to control the use of their image is restricted. This 
restriction is particularly acute when the image is captured by a third 
party. The difficulty that arises is that the creator of the image has 
the right to control the use of the photograph. Consequently, the 
person who is the subject of that image is unable to control how the 
image and the information captured in the image are used. The lack 
of user’s control over their image was also highlighted above in the 
New York case Foster v. Svenson, where the Fosters were unable to 
control the use of their images that had been captured by Svenson 
because the image fell within an artistic work.197 When personal 
images are uploaded on social networks such as Facebook, those 
images are effectively controlled by the social network and may be 
accessed or stored even if a user has withdrawn their consent.198 The 
New York Privacy Act, if enacted, and successful, potentially pro-
vides privacy protection that is more robust as it would be in 
 
194 Mantelero, supra note 4, at 230. 
195 See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 80; see also Case C-
131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), 2014 
E.C.R. 317, ¶ 20. 
196 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 81. 
197 See Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150, 158–59 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). 
198 See Georgiades, supra note 2, at 435–45. 
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addition to the existing protection that is afforded under the current 
legal framework. 
The European right to be forgotten would provide people  
in Australia or the United States with greater control over their  
images if both countries adopted the right. However, to improve fur-
ther, a number of changes should be considered in the European 
model itself. The European law could be improved, for example, by 
clarifying who has the responsibility to remove images, particularly 
where there are multiple parties involved. It would also be helpful 
to clarify the situations where an image may be required to be  
removed or deleted. 
Clarification is also needed about when consent may be with-
drawn. To minimize the adverse effects of the exception it might 
also be useful to consider limiting its use to reasonable with-
drawal.199 Consideration should also be given to amending the  
personal and household exemption,200 because if a personal and 
 
199 See, e.g., General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 7; see also id. at 
rec. 32: 
Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely 
given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data 
subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him 
or her, such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, 
or an oral statement. This could include ticking a box when visiting an 
internet website, choosing technical settings for information society 
services or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this 
context the data subject’s acceptance of the proposed processing of his 
or her personal data. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not 
therefore constitute consent. Consent should cover all processing 
activities carried out for the same purpose or purposes. When the 
processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of 
them. If the data subject’s consent is to be given following a request 
by electronic means, the request must be clear, concise and not 
unnecessarily disruptive to the use of the service for which it is 
provided. 
200 Oliver Butler, The Expanding Scope of the Data Protection Directive: The Exception 
for a ‘Purely Personal or Household Activity,’ 3–4, 8 (Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law, 
Working Paper No. 54, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2660916 [https://perma.cc/DN9P-
G8GV] (referring to the problem of using spatial logic in the interpretation of the exception 
of purely personal or household activity which applies to the Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC). In particular, the author refers to Ryneš v. Úrad pro ochranu osobních údaju, 
C-212/13, ECR 0 (2014), where he quotes the Advocate General:  
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house purpose was included in Australian law it would leave many 
images unprotected and vulnerable to misuse. However, any such 
modification of the European model in this respect would have to be 
done in a manner that carefully balanced the right of individuals to 
protect their personal images with the ability for individuals to  
express themselves by uploading images (which was the motivation 
behind the exception). This is not to suggest that the exception 
should be abolished so much that it should be modified to take  
account of the new realities of new technologies.201 
Overall, it is clear that the EU GDPR provides better protection 
for people whose images are shared and exchanged on social net-
works. This Article has argued that the EU’s right to be forgotten is 
a useful mechanism that enables people to regain control over the 
use of their images within a social network context. The European 
right to be forgotten is intended to rebalance the scales between free-
dom of expression and privacy, especially when the information is 
outdated or no longer relevant.202 This Article has shown that there 
are exceptions as to the operation of the right to be forgotten which 
could serve to limit the right, such as freedom of expression and the 
press. 
The Article has shown that while American courts have tradi-
tionally favored freedom of expression over privacy interests, there 
 
In my view, “personal” activities under the second indent of Article 
3(2) of Directive 95/46 are activities which are closely and objectively 
linked to the private life of an individual and which do not significantly 
impinge upon the personal sphere of others. These activities may, 
however, take place outside the home. “Household” activities are 
linked to family life and normally take place at a person’s home or in 
other places shared with family members, such as second homes, hotel 
rooms or private cars. All such activities have a link with the protection 
of private life as provided for under Article 7 of the Charter.  
Id. at 3–4. 
201 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party “urge[d] the legislature to use the 
process of introducing new data protection law as an opportunity to reduce as far as 
possible the legal uncertainty that currently surrounds various aspects of individuals’ 
personal or household use of the internet.” Working Party, Annex 2, supra note 81, at 3. 
202 See generally Nizer, supra note 167; see also Barbas, supra, note 167; Grea, supra 
note 76; Storella, supra note 167; W.A.C., supra note 167; Webner & Lindquist, supra 
note 167. 
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is an increasing push to strengthen privacy protection. Despite not 
having a unified single legislative instrument for the protection of 
privacy, some states like New York have considered and proposed 
privacy law reform by incorporating a right to be forgotten in their 
statutory legislation. If passed, New York courts could serve as a 
potential model for other states to follow suit. It is worth noting that 
even if the United States incorporated a right to be forgotten, it may 
not restrict freedom of expression as the American courts are likely 
to rule in favor of First Amendment claims. Currently the law in 
Australia values freedom of expression over privacy. While this may 
have made sense in a pre-internet world, technological changes that 
have radically changed the way that images are used and controlled 
have challenged the now-outdated arrangements. The right to be for-
gotten would help to reset the scales between privacy and freedom 
of expression. It is time that Australian law provided people with the 
right to be forgotten as a way of preventing the misuse of their im-
ages. In so doing it would give them the right to control the use of 
their personal images online. 
